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THE JUDICIAL VACANCY CONUNDRUM IN THE 
NINTH CIBCUIT. 
Carl Tobiast 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
must resolve the largest and most complicated caseload of the 
twelve regional appellate courts. Congress has authorized 
twenty-eight active judges for the circuit, while the Judicial 
Conference of the United States has recommended that 
Congress approve nine additional judgeships for the court. The 
Ninth Circuit currently has seven vacancies, four of which are 
considered "judicial emergencies" because the openings have 
remained unfilled for eighteen months, even as the size and 
complexity of the court's civil and criminal dockets continue to 
increase. President Bill Clinton submitted the names of 
nominees for seven vacancies during 1997; however, the 
Senate had confirmed no one for the court when the first 
session of the 105th Congress recessed in mid-November. The 
large number of empty seats and their prolonged character as 
well as burgeoning appeals have required the Ninth Circuit to 
cancel 600 oral arguments and to rely on many appellate and 
district judges who are not active members of the court when 
staffing panels. The factors above mean that the situation in 
the Ninth Circuit may have reached crisis proportions. These 
circumstances warrant analysis; this essay undertakes that 
effort. 
I first examine how conditions in the Ninth Circuit became 
so critical, emphasizing caseload expansion and judicial 
openings. The second part evaluates recent developments that 
have led to vacancies in one-quarter of the tot.al complement of 
active judgeships which Congress has authorized for the court. 
• ©1997 Carl Tobias. All Rights Reserved. 
t Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Peggy Sanner for 
valuable suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wtlmerton for processing this 
piece, and the Harris Trust for generous, continuing support. Errors that remain 
are mine. 
1283 
1284 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW (Vol. 63: 1283 
Finding that the growing number and complexity of civil and 
criminal appeals filed in the Ninth Circuit and that the remote 
possibility of expeditiously confirming judges for all of the 
present openings seriously threaten appellate justice, I afford 
suggestions which could remedy this conundrum. 
I. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONUNDRUM 
The origins and development of the judicial vacancy dilem-
ma which currently exists in the Ninth Circuit might seem to 
warrant comparatively limited examination in this essay be-
cause numerous aspects of the relevant history have been 
explored elsewhere.1 Nevertheless, somewhat detailed treat-
ment is required because that type of assessment should en-
hance understanding of exactly how the present circumstances 
arose and how they might be addressed. 
The substantial number of openings which the Ninth Cir-
cuit now has and those empty seats' protracted nature exem-
plify considerably broader phenomena that have detrimentally 
affected much of the federal court system. Nearly all of the 
appellate courts and many of the federal districts have experi-
enced what may be characterized as a persistent vacancies 
problem for approximately two decades. This difficulty, which 
can be attributed principally to political phenomena, has ap-
parently resulted from the inability of presidents to nominate, 
and the Senate to confirm, judges with sufficient expedition to 
fill all of the existing openings. 
The persistent vacancies problem traces its origins to the 
1960s when Congress began enlarging federal court civil and 
criminal jurisdiction.2 Increases in the number of civil causes 
of action and federal crimes prompted significant growth in 
civil and criminal district and appellate caseloads. Congress 
responded to these mounting dockets by authorizing many 
1 See, e.g., Gordon Bermant et al., Judicial Vacancies: An Examination of the 
Problem and Possible Solutions, 14 MISS. C. L. REV. 319 (1994); Carl Tobias, Fed· 
eral Judicial Selection in a Time of Divided Government, 47 EMORY L.J. No. 2 
(May 1998). See generally SHELDON GoLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER 
COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN (1997). 
2 See, e.g., Bermant, supra note 1, at 323-33; Carl Tobias, The New Certiorari 
and a National Study of the Appeals Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1264, 1270 
(1996). 
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additional district and appeals court judgeships. However, 
Chief Executives and the Senate have encountered substantial 
difficulty in approving federal judges for all of the empty judi-
cial seats partly because the bench's expansion has led to 
greater numbers of openings which have arisen with increasing 
frequency. For example, throughout much of the administra-
tions of President Bill Clinton and former President George 
Bush, federal courts experienced numerous vacancies, there 
are now more than eighty empty judgeships. 
This persistent vacancies dilemma has applied with con-
siderable force to the Ninth Circuit for several reasons. The 
court has encountered the largest appellate caseload since 
1980, when Congress divided the former Fifth Circuit into two 
appeals courts.3 Moreover, a 1978 statute authorized all re-
gional circuits with more than fifteen active judges to adopt 
special procedures, namely administrative units and limited en 
bane mechanisms, which would facilitate resolution of their 
growing dockets.4 Another aspect of that legislation approved 
ten new judgeships for the Ninth Circuit, while former Presi-
dent Jimmy Carter undertook special efforts to fill the judicial 
positions authorized and appointed thirteen members of the 
court in 1979 and 1980.5 Congressional passage of an addition-
al judgeships bill in 1984 brought the Ninth Circuit to its pres-
ent strength of twenty-eight active members,6 which means 
3 See Act of Oct. 14, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994 (current version 
at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1994)). See generally DEBORAH J. BARROW & THOMAS G. WAU\.-
ER, A COURT DIVIDED-THE FIFTH CmcUIT COURT OF APPEALS AND 'l1IE POLlTICS 
OF JUDICIAL REFORM (1988); HARVEY COUCH, A HISroRY OF 'l1IE FIFm CmCUIT 
1891-1981 (1984). 
' The statute reads: 
Any court of appeals having more than 15 active judges mny constitute 
itself into administrative units complete with such facilities and staff ns 
may be prescribed by the Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts, and may perform its en bane function by such number of mem-
bers of its en bane court as may be prescribed by rule or the court or 
appeals. 
Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629, 1633, supplemented 
by Act of Oct. 15, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (1981). 
5 Id. § 3, 92 Stat. 1632. See generally GoLDMAN, supra note 1, at 236-84. 
6 See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-353, § 201, 98 Stat. 333, 347 (1984). 
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that the court has a much larger complement of judges than 
any of the regional circuits and experiences considerably more 
frequent vacancies. 
There is also a current impasse over filling the approxi-
mately eighty present openings on the federal appellate and 
district bench. The existing situation shares certain character-
istics of the persistent vacancies problem but differs in some 
important respects. The current conundrum seems attributable 
principally to political factors which derive substantially from 
different political parties' control of the presidency and the 
Senate. The dilemma also partially results from the inability 
or unwillingness of officials in the Executive Branch and the 
Senate to discharge their respective responsibilities for nomi-
nating and confirming candidates to the federal courts. 
Regardless of who created, or might have prevented, the 
persistent problem and the present impasse, both of these 
developments have meant that there are now more than eighty 
vacancies on the federal appellate and district courts and sev-
en openings on the Ninth Circuit, half of which constitute 
judicial emergencies. The permanent conundrum and the cur-
rent problem have imposed many disadvantages. Numerous 
federal district courts have experienced backlogs on their civil 
dockets, while some district judges have not conducted a single 
civil trial in the last two years. 
Most of the regional appeals courts have had to depend 
more often on judges who are not active members of the courts, 
a phenomenon which can undermine collegiality and even 
erode consistency in circuit precedent. Appellate court judges 
have also placed greater reliance on support staff to help them. 
Almost all of the appeals courts have correspondingly limited 
the percentage of oral arguments and published decisions that 
they have afforded, while a few have even postponed oral argu-
ments. 
The longstanding judicial vacancies difficulty and the 
current dilemma have had some of the detrimental effects 
which I described above and additional deleterious impacts on 
the Ninth Circuit. I examine in the next section the large num-
ber, and protracted character, of unfilled seats in the Ninth 
Circuit. 
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II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
For much of the period since 1978, when Congress autho-
rized a substantial increase in the number of judgeships on the 
Ninth Circuit, the court has experienced comparatively few 
vacancies. The openings only rose to significant levels and the 
seats remained empty for prolonged periods during 1995 when 
filling those judgeships became inextricably intertwined with 
proposals to split the Ninth Circuit. 
In May 1995, Republican Party senators who represent 
states of the Pacific Northwest mounted the fifth serious effort 
since 1983 to divide the court.7 The Senate members intro-
duced a bill that would have placed the five Northwestern 
states in a new Twelfth Circuit and would have left the re-
maining states and territories of the existing Ninth Circuit in 
that court.8 Soon after the measure's introduction, Senator 
Conrad Burns CR-Mont.) announced that he would place a hold 
on all nominees to the Ninth Circuit until Congress bifurcated 
the court.9 Senator Burns only removed this hold in early 1996 
when the Senate confirmed Judge A Wallace Tashima and 
Judge Sidney Thomas to the court. However, no judges re-
ceived appointments to the Ninth Circuit in the remainder of 
the 1996 presidential election year or throughout 1997, the 
first year of the Clinton Administration's second term. 
During 1996 and 1997, eight active judges on the court 
decided to assume senior status or to retire, thus creating 
vacancies. Both Democratic and Republican presidents had 
appointed the jurists. Some of the judges were apparently 
following or attempting to honor an informal tradition of as-
suming senior status or resigning during the administration of 
a Chief Executive of the same political party as the president 
who named the judges. For example, this phenomenon could 
explain why a few Democratic appointees assumed senior sta-
7 See S. 956, 104th Cong. (1995); see also S. 853, 104th Cong. (1995); Thomas 
E. Baker, On Redrawing Circuit Boundaries-Why the Proposal to Diuide the Unit· 
ed States Court of Appeals for the Nmth Circuit is Not Such a Gaod Idea, 22 
Aruz. ST. L.J. 917 (1990). See generally Carl Tobias, The Impouerished Idea of Cir· 
cuit-Splitting, 44 EMORY L.J. 1357 (1995). 
• See S. 956, 104th Cong. (1995); see also S. 853, 104th Cong. (1995). 
9 See Montana Senator Jeopardizes Candidacies for 9th Circuit, S.F. DAILY J., 
June 8, 1995, at 1. 
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tus rather early in 1996, thereby ostensibly enabling President 
Clinton to name their successors. Several Republican appoint-
ees who may have awaited the 1996 election returns to ascer-
tain whether a Republican might capture the White House 
could have decided correspondingly to assume senior status 
once that eventuality failed to materialize, rather than wait an 
additional four years.10 
Several reasons explain why only two judges have secured 
appointment to the Ninth Circuit from May 1995 until 1998. 
First, the Senate did not confirm any nominees to the court in 
1995 after Senator Burns placed his hold on confirmation be-
cause one member of that body can delay the entire Senate's 
action under the chamber's unanimous consent procedure. 
When Senator Burns lifted his hold in early 1996, the Senate 
confirmed Judges Tashima and Thomas. 
However, the Senate approved no additional nominees for 
the Ninth Circuit during 1996.11 Perhaps the most important 
explanation for inaction was that a presidential election oc-
curred in 1996. This meant that during the first five months of 
the year, Senator Robert Dole (R-Kan.), who was serving as 
Senate Majority Leader and attempting to secure the Republi-
can presidential nomination, was apparently reluctant to 
schedule floor votes on appellate court nominees lest he evince 
a lack of confidence in his own presidential aspirations. 
Once Senator Dole resigned from the Senate and Senator 
Trent Lott (R-Miss.) succeeded him, there ensued a period 
when Senator Lott was apparently proceeding with caution in 
mastering his responsibilities as Majority Leader. By the time 
that the new Senate Majority Leader was prepared to schedule 
floor debate and floor votes on nominees, it was mid-summer of 
an election year when the confirmation process has traditional-
ly slowed in anticipation of the presidential election. Republi-
can Party hopes that Senator Dole might capture the White 
House and afford the GOP the opportunity to fill existing judi-
10 An active judge becomes eligible to assume senior status when the sum of 
the judge's age and years of service equals eighty. See 28 U.S.C. § 371 (1994). 
11 A few nominees received Committee hearings or Committee votes, but none 
received full Senate consideration. 
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cial vacancies and Senator Lott's reluctance to exhibit insuffi-
cient confidence in the Dole candidacy by promptly processing 
judicial nominees may have additionally delayed confirmation. 
In any event, during the summer, the Republican and 
Democratic leadership in the Senate reached an agreement on 
the confirmation process whereby the Senate would consider 
one nominee per day until the Labor Day recess. That agree-
ment enabled the Senate to confirm thirteen judges for the 
district court bench. Some appeals court nominees did have 
Judiciary Committee hearings in 1996, but none of the judges 
receiving appointment were named members of any appellate 
court, including the Ninth Circuit. 
During March 1996, proponents of the proposal to bifur-
cate the Ninth Circuit concluded that they lacked the requisite 
votes to pass the measure.12 These Republican senators, 
therefore, agreed on a compromise proposal which would have 
authorized a national commission to evaluate appellate courts. 
The measure easily passed the Senate, but the proposal lan-
guished in the House. Congress did appropriate $500,000 for 
the study; however, it failed to enact authorizing legislation.13 
In 1997, several study commission bills were introduced in 
the House and the Senate.14 On June 3, the House approved 
proposed legislation which would have authorized a study.15 
In late July, the Senate passed an appropriations rider that 
would have divided the Ninth Circuit.16 In November, Con-
gress adopted and President Clinton signed a measure which 
provided for a national study of the appellate courts, with 
particular reference to the Ninth Circuit.17 
12 I rely in this sentence and the next on Carl Tobins, Why Congress Should 
Not Split the Ninth Circuit, 50 SMU L. REV. 583, 589 (1997); see also 142 CONG. 
REc. S2219-S2303 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1996). 
13 See 142 CONG. REC. Hll,859 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1996). 
1
' See, e.g., S. 248, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 283, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 639, 
105th Cong. (1997). 
J.S See H.R. 908, 105th Cong. (1997); see also Carl Tobias, House Authorizes Ap-
pellate Court Study Commission, 80 JUDICATURE 292 (1997). 
16 See S. 1022, 105th Cong., § 305 (1997). 
17 See Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305, 111 Stat. 2440, 2491-92 (1997); see also Carl 
Tobias, Suggestions for Studying the Federal Appellate System, 49 FLA. L. REv. 
189 (1997); Carl Tobias, Congress Authorizes Appellate Study Panel, 81 JUDICATURE 
125 (1997). The authorization of that study should temporarily eliminate the issue 
of splitting the court as an obstacle to the confirmation of judges for the Ninth 
Circuit. 
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During 1997, no judge secured appointment to the Ninth 
Circuit. The inability or unwillingness to approve judges for 
the court can be ascribed to numerous individuals and entities 
with responsibility for judicial selection. Some observers have 
attributed the delay in naming judges to the machinations 
which involved proposals for splitting the Ninth Circuit,18 al-
though it is impossible to prove that senators who favor divi-
sion may have been employing delay or refusal to confirm 
judges as a tactic for imposing pressure on the court and fos-
tering its bifurcation. For example, the larger number of open-
ings that the court experiences and the longer that they re-
main open, the more the court's judges might feel that they 
should accede to division and the greater difficulty they will 
encounter in promptly processing appeals. 
Another explanation for the dearth of judges appointed to 
the Ninth Circuit is the current impasse over the approval of 
federal judges for all eighty openings. For example, President 
Clinton may have submitted at a regular pace an insufficient 
number of nominees whom Republican senators considered 
acceptable, especially early in 1997. Senator Orrin Hatch (R-
Utah), chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, could have 
permitted too few hearings and Committee votes on the can-
didates whom the Chief Executive tendered. Senator Lott, for 
his part, appeared to schedule infrequently floor votes and 
debates on nominees who had received favorable Committee 
votes. In short, all who were responsibile for judicial selection 
probably could have done more to expedite the process. 
These ideas apply with greater specificity to the Ninth 
Circuit. For example, on January 7, 1997, President Clinton 
renominated three individuals whom the Senate had earlier 
failed to confirm.19 However, the administration did not sub-
mit another nominee until late June, and,a fifth person during 
late July, while tendering the names of two additional people 
in November.20 In fairness, the Chief Executive may have 
18 See, e.g., Carol M. Ostrom, Fuming Senators Ready to Carve Up 9th Circuit· 
NW States Would be in New District, SEA'ITLE TIMES, Nov. 2, 1997, at Al; David 
G. Savage, Debate Rises Ouer Proposal to Break Up Appeals Court, L.A. TIMES, 
Sept. 21, 1997, at A3. 
19 They were Professor William Fletcher, Margaret McKeown, and District 
Judge Richard Paez. See The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, President 
Clinton Nominates Twenty-two to the Federal Bench (Jan. 7, 1997). 
20 The late June nominee was District Judge James Ware and the late July 
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seen little reason to nominate more individuals promptly, giv-
en the slow pace at which the Senate was processing candi-
dates. The Senate Judiciary Committee correspondingly con-
ducted hearings on one of the seven nominees for the court 
who subsequently requested that his name be withdrawn from 
consideration21 and on a second person whom the Committee 
approved but on whom the Senate failed to vote before it re-
cessed.22 
There have also been disputes over filling particular va-
cancies. For example, Republican senators from Arizona and 
Washington argued that they must participate in recommend-
ing candidates for openings in their states and have even in-
sisted that they are entitled to make the suggestions.23 These 
machinations seriously delayed nominations for vacancies in 
Arizona and Washington, although accord was apparently 
reached and the Chief Executive submitted nominees for both 
empty seats in November.24 
The large number and protracted nature of the openings 
have had numerous detrimental effects. The vacancies have 
imposed enormous pressure on active appeals court judges, the 
appellate judges who have assumed senior status, and the ac-
tive and senior district judges who sit in the Ninth Circuit. For 
nominee was Oregon Supreme Court Justice Susan Graber. See The White House, 
Office of the Press Sec'y, President Clinton Nominates Ware to the Appellate Bench 
(June 27, 1997); The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Clinton 
Nominates Greiber to the Appellate Bench (July 30, 1997); The White Howe, Office 
of the Press Sec'y, President Clinton Nominates Siluermcm to the Appellate Bench 
(Nov. 8, 1997); The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Clinton Nom-
inates Gould to the Appellate Bench (Nov. 8, 1997). 
21 This was Judge Ware. See supra note 20; see also David G. Savage & 
Maura Dolan, Judge Admits Tale of Brother's Death Was a Lie, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 
7, 1997, at Al. 
22 This was Magistrate Judge Silverman. See supra note 20; see also infra 
notes 24, 29-30 and accompanying text. The Senate confirmed Judge Silverman in 
January 1998. See Arizonan Gets 9th Circuit Seat, TuCSON ClTIZEN, Jan. 30, 1998, 
at 2C. 
23 See, e.g., Peter Callaghan, Senators Agree on Selecting Judges, TACOMA NEWS 
TRIBUNE, Aug. 12, 1997, at Bl; Neil A. Lewis, Clinton Has a Chance to Shape the 
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1997, at l; see also 143 CoNG. REC. S2538, S2541 
(daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Biden) (suggesting GOP senators may 
have so intimated). 
2
' These nominees were Magistrate Judge Barry Silverman and Ronald Gould. 
See supra notes 20, 22; see also infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. 
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example, the active and senior appellate judges have heard 
more oral arguments and authored more opinions than they 
would have were the court at full strength. 
The circuit may also have had to invoke numerous mea-
sures that enable it to resolve expanding dockets with insuffi-
cient resources. For example, the deficient resources might 
have prompted the court to grant fewer oral arguments or to 
issue written decisions in a smaller percentage of cases. The 
situation concomitantly could have led judges to rely more 
substantially on court staff, such as staff attorneys and law 
clerks. Judges may even have had less time to review petitions 
and briefs, to prepare for oral arguments and to confer on, 
draft, circulate and finalize opinions. 
Symptomatic of certain difficulties that are enumerated 
above is the Ninth Circuit's substantially increased reliance on 
judges who are not active members of the court to participate 
on three-judge panels. The Ninth Circuit has a long tradition 
of depending on its own senior appeals and district judges and 
active district judges as well as appellate and district judges 
who sit in other appeals courts, but has resorted to that prac-
tice with increasing frequency since 1995. Indeed, a judge of 
the Court of International Trade recently sat on the court. It is 
difficult to identify the effects of increasing reliance on judges 
who are not active members of the Ninth Circuit. However, 
dependence on these judges may undermine collegiality, a 
phenomenon which is said to expedite appellate dispositions. 
Reliance on "outside" judges correspondingly might have re-
duced coherence in the law of the circuit because they could be 
less familiar not only with one another but also with the 
court's substantive decisionmaking and its traditions. 
The phenomena that I examined earlier might also delay 
the Ninth Circuit's disposition of appeals, thus complicating 
the efforts of a court which already experiences considerable 
difficulty in expediting resolution of its enormous docket. Any 
court that is attempting to operate with only two-thirds of its 
authorized complement will encounter even greater problems 
in promptly concluding appellate disputes. Indeed, numerous 
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factors which I considered already have compelled the Ninth 
Circuit to cancel 600 oral arguments at great cost to the court, 
lawyers, and litigants.25 
In sum, the large number and lengthy character of the 
judicial vacancies which now exist in the Ninth Circuit have 
apparently had numerous disadvantageous effects on the court. 
These circumstances mean that all three branches of the feder-
al government, but especially President Clinton and the Sen-
ate, must work cooperatively in attempting to appoint judges 
for all of the present openings as promptly as possible. 
Ill. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FuTuRE 
Republican Party senators who comprise a majority in the 
upper chamber should institute numerous measures to expe-
dite the filling of the nine vacancies which currently exist on 
the Ninth Circuit. The Senate Judiciary Committee and its 
chair, the Senate Majority Leader, and individual Republican 
senators, particularly lawmakers who represent states situated 
in the Ninth Circuit where openings exist, could implement 
these approaches. First, and perhaps foremost, they should no 
longer consider the controversy over the Ninth Circuit's possi-
ble bifurcation as an impediment to confirming judges, because 
congressional approval of a study commission which will em-
phasize the court removes the issue of Ninth Circuit division 
as a reason for delaying appointments. 
The Judiciary Committee and Senator Hatch should con-
tinue employing the type of concerted efforts which they under-
took between the time that the Senate returned from its Au-
gust recess and the mid-November date on which the first 
session of the 105th Congress recessed. This work enabled the 
Senate to confirm three times as many judges during the final 
two and one-half months of the session as the Senate had 
approved between January and early September of the same 
year. 
25 See, e.g., Viveca Novak, Empty-Bench Syndrome, TUJE, May 26, 19!n, at 37; 
Chronic Federal Judge Slwrtage Puts Liues, Justice On. Hold, LAs VEGAS REvIEw-
JOURNAL, Aug. 13, 1997, at A9; see also id. (stating that 6th Circuit canceled 60 
arguments); Bill Kisliuk, Judges' Conference Slams Circuit.Splitting, Vacancies, THE 
RECORDER, Aug. 19, 1997, at 1. 
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Now that the second session of the 105th Congress bas 
convened, the Committee and the chair should schedule hear-
ings promptly for the nominees whom the Committee bas in-
vestigated but did not accord hearings during 1997 and for the 
nominees whom President Clinton bas proposed, or will sub-
mit, in 1998. This might require the Committee and Senator 
Hatch to alter somewhat the schedule that they followed in the 
first session and throughout the 104th Congress, whereby only 
one appeals court nominee testified at each hearing, which was 
typically held once a month.26 The Committee may need to 
schedule multiple hearings every month or permit testimony of 
more than one appellate court nominee in a specific hearing. 
The Committee could consider holding a special hearing for 
several nominees to the Ninth Circuit or at least contemplate 
moving some of these individuals forward in the queue. The 
Committee might even eschew hearings for noncontroversial 
nominees because the proceedings are essentially ceremonial, 
although the symbolic and actual significance of appeals court 
judgeships may make some sel}.ators reluctant to follow this 
approach. The critical situation that currently exists in the 
Ninth Circuit may justify the invocation of these efforts. 
The Committee and its chair should schedule hearings and 
Committee votes on all nominees, even if one or more senators 
object to specific candidates. These nominees should be permit-
ted to testify and to have the Committee debate and vote on 
their fitness to serve. President Clinton is concomitantly enti-
tled to forward the nominations of people whom he believes 
will be excellent federal judges, while both the President and 
the nominees should be able to expect that the individuals will 
receive hearings on the merits of their candidacies and fair 
votes. Subject to institutional constraints and traditional un-
derstandings of the Senate's role in giving advice and consent, 
the Committee and members can freely and rigorously ques-
tion nominees and vote against those whom the lawmakers 
find unfit for federal appellate service. For example, senators 
26 See Carl Tobias, Filling the Federal Courts in an Election Year, 49 SMU L. 
REV. 309, 318 (1996); see also Carl Tobias, Choosing Federal Judges in the Second 
Clinton Administration, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 741, 744 (1997). 
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who are concerned that nominees might become activist judges 
if approved may want to probe in confirmation hearings 
individuals' potential to so behave once on the bench.27 
It will generally be better to have issues, such as those 
enumerated above, aired in a public forum, particularly if 
specific nominees favor this approach. Nevertheless, some 
candidates may prefer that these questions be considered in 
private or the potential for embarrassment or waste of resourc-
es could make that public treatment less desirable. However, 
these situations should be the exception, and should be the 
subject of private negotiations between the chair, the Clinton 
Administration and the individual nominee. 
The Senate Majority Leader must implement actions 
which will expedite full Senate consideration of nominees who 
secure Judiciary Committee approval. For instance, Senator 
Lott should schedule floor votes promptly after he is notified of 
favorable Committee action. To the extent that delay can be 
ascribed to controversy over specific candidates, particularly 
dissatisfaction of the Majority Leader or individual senators, 
Senator Lott might permit increased floor debate and final 
votes on these nominees. For example, the discussion which 
preceded Judge Merrick Garland's confirmation apparently 
fostered open and healthy interchange on the Senate floor.23 
President Clinton could institute measures which might 
expedite the confirmation of judges for the numerous vacancies 
that presently exist on the Ninth Circuit. The Chief Executive 
expeditiously nominated persons for two empty seats once the 
Senate returned for the second session of the 105th Con-
27 See, e.g., Hearings on Judicial Activism: Assessing the Impad Before the 
Senate Judiciary Constitution Subcomm., 105th Cong. (1997); 143 CONG. REC. 
82515 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
28 See 143 CONG. REC. S2515-41 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997); see also Eva M. 
Rodriguez, Garland: A Centrist Choice, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 7, 1995, nt 1. Insofar 
as the Senate Majority Leader has premised floor votes for judicial nominees on 
other contingencies, such as President Clinton's submission of names for the Fed-
eral Election Commission openings, the importance of filling court vacancies sug-
gests that Senator Lott cease this practice. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 75. 
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gress.29 The Clinton Administration should promptly nomi-
nate individuals for the two openings as to which no nominees 
have been tendered. 
President Clinton can best facilitate the filling of the cur-
rent vacancies by certain practices that he followed near the 
end of the first session of the 105th Congress. The administra-
tion must identify and nominate individuals with excellent 
qualifications who will prove acceptable to senators from the 
states in which the opening will be filled by conferring with 
those lawmakers about candidates. Illustrative are the nomi-
nations in Arizona of Magistrate Judge Barry Silverman, 
whom the state's two Republican senators seemingly found 
acceptable and of Ronald Gould, a distinguished practitioner 
from Seattle, Washington, whom Senator Slade Gorton (R-
Wash.) apparently supported.30 Indeed, the Chief Executive 
nominated Magistrate Judge Silverman in early November, the 
Judiciary Committee conducted a hearing on the nominee on 
November 9, and the full Committee voted favorably on 
Silverman three days later.31 However, Congress recessed be-
fore the Senate could consider the nominee. 32 
President Clinton, therefore, must search for and nominate 
people who are intelligent, independent, industrious and have 
measured judicial temperament. The Chief Executive may 
want to consider nominating persons who have moderate polit-
ical perspectives, as did most of his nominees during his first 
29 See The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Clinton Nominates 
Berzon to the Appellate Bench (Jan. 27, 1998); The White House, Office of the 
Press Sec'y, President Clinton Nominates Wardlaw to the Appellate Bench (Jan. 27, 
1998). 
30 See supra notes 20, 24. 
31 I rely in this sentence and the next on Senate Dems Put Judge Pick on 
Hold, ARlzONA REPUBLIC, Nov. 15, 1997, at Bl; see also Adrianne Flynn, Arizona 
Lawmakers Post Wins as Session Ends; Actions Include Court Nominee, Key Bills 
Passed, AruzoNA REPUBLIC, Nov. 13, 1997, at A2; supra notes 20, 24 and accompa· 
nying text. 
32 The Senate did confirm Judge Silverman shortly after the second session of 
the 105th Congress convened. See Arizonan Gets 9th Circuit Seat, THE TUSCON 
CITIZEN, Jan. 30, 1998, at 2C. 
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Administration, 33 because Senator Hatch and numerous other 
Republican senators have clearly stated that they will not 
confirm nominees who promise to be "activist judges."34 
Prior judicial service, although not a prerequisite, is a 
desirable attribute which some nominees will possess. For 
instance, Judge Wallace Tashima was a highly-regarded judge 
of the Central District of California before his recent elevation 
to the Ninth Circuit, and Judge Susan Graber had been a 
distinguished member of the Oregon Supreme Court since 
1990. Individuals who have previously served on the bench 
afford the advantage of that experience, while federal district 
judges have already received Senate confirmation. The Chief 
Executive may· want to accord special consideration to present-
ly-sitting district judges, such as Judge Sonia Sotomayor, 
whom Republican presidents appointed, because the Republi-
can majority in the Senate may be inclined to view these indi-
viduals favorably.35 
President Clinton should closely consult with Senator 
Hatch regarding potential nominees. The administration must 
seek the chair's counsel and suggestions, although it need not 
always follow his advice. The Chief Executive should also com-
municate with other members of the Judiciary Committ.ee and 
senators who represent states in which openings exist, because 
the lawmakers can play important roles in the confirmation 
process, as they apparently did in Arizona and Washington.35 
If the above approaches, which may fairly be characterized 
as conciliatory, do not prove efficacious, President Clinton may 
want to entertain and employ less cooperative measures. For 
instance, he might rely on the presidency as a bully pulpit to 
blame the Ninth Circuit vacancies on Republican senators, or 
for cajoling or shaming the legislators into expediting appoint-
ments. The Chief Executive may even force the issue of de-
33 See Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Clinton's First Term Judiciary: Many 
Bridges to Cross, 80 JUDICATURE 254 {1997); Ronald Stidham ct nl, The Voting 
Behavior of President Clinton's Judicial Appointees, 80 JUDICATURE 16 {1996). 
u See, e.g., Orrin G. Hatch, There's No Vacancy Crisis in the Federal Courts, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 1997, at Al5; supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
35 See The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Clinton Nominates 
Sotomayor to the Appellate Bench {June 25, 1997); see also supra notes 20-21 and 
accompanying text. 
36 See supra notes 23-24, 30-31 and accompanying text. 
1298 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63: 1283 
layed selection by taking it to the American people. Related 
means for breaking the impasse might be the submission of 
nominees for all seven current openings or reliance on recess 
appointments,37 each of which could pressure the Senate to 
process nominees by publicizing or dramatizing how protracted 
vacancies threaten justice and the importance of promptly 
choosing more judges. 
CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit currently has vacancies in seven of the 
court's twenty-eight active judgeships that Congress has autho-
rized, while the appeals court confronts a docket which contin-
ues to increase in size and complexity. The failure or inability 
to fill these openings has threatened the delivery of appellate 
justice in the West. President Clinton and the Senate must 
work closely together so that they may expeditiously appoint 
judges to these empty seats. 
37 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. See generally Tobias, supra note 1, at 49-52. 
